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ABSTRACT
CIVIL CONFLICT: ROLE OF GRIEVANCE AND TERRORISM
OLGAHAN ÇAT
ECONOMICS M.A. THESIS, JULY 2019
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Özgür Kıbrıs
Keywords: game theory, conflict, t errorism, e thnic g rievance, d uration, forecast.
In order to understand the role of grievance and terrorism in state-rebel conflicts, as 
an extension to Gibilisco’s (2016) manuscript, a two stage sequential game between 
two players is designed. Addition to having explained late separations of rebel 
groups and separations of all groups with varying initial grievance levels, equilibria 
of this game produced 2 testable hypotheses: First, use of terrorism enhances the 
chances of getting a concession or negotiation. Second, the conflicts i n w hich more 
terrorist attacks are conducted are likely to finish e a rlier. H aving t ested t he latter 
one, I finished my thesis by attempting to forecast the durations of ongoing conflicts, 
making use of contemporary machine learning algorithms.
iv
ÖZET
İÇ ÇATIŞMA: TERÖRİZM VE KİNİN ROLÜ
OLGAHAN ÇAT
EKONOMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. ÖZGÜR KIBRIS
Anahtar Kelimeler: oyun teorisi, çatışma, terörizm, etnik kin, süre, tahmin
Kin ve terörizmin devlet-isyancı grup çatışmalarındaki rolünü daha iyi anlamak için,
Gibilisco’nun çalışmasına bir tevsi olarak, 2 oyuncudan oluşan 2 kısımlı bir oyun
dizayn edildi. Geç gerçekleşen ayrılışlar ve her seviyeden başlangıç kinini kapsayan
ayrılışlara ek olarak, bu oyunun dengeleri bize test edilebilir 2 hipotez verdi: İlki,
terörist ataklar ayrılıkçı grup için müzakereye oturma veya imtiyaz edinme şansını
arttırıyor. İkincisi, daha fazla terörist atak gözlemlediğimiz çatışmalar daha erken
sonuçlanıyor. İkincisini kendim test etmekle beraber, tezimi çağdaş makine öğren-
mesi algoritmalarını kullanarak süregelen iç çatışmaların sürelerini tahmin ederek
tamamladım.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism has been a tool that is widely used by many groups and comes in many
forms. Terrorism, in this paper, is defined as deliberately attacking civilians with
violent means to attain political goals. Many groups find it effective to achieve
their process goals and outcome goals, as defined by Abrahms (2012). To achieve
such goals, Kydd and Walter (2006) enumerate the 5 strategies of terrorism as
attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. Groups use it to
bear high costs on governments while incurring very less logistical costs. We even
see forms of terrorism where a terrorist just rents a van and crashes into civilians,
imposing such high damages while incurring almost no logistical cost. Although
these attacks galvanize extremists to join the rebel group (Mishal and Sela 2006),
targeting civilians comes at another cost which risks the losing the moderate base
of supporters (Pape 2003) (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007). Usually, it is
harder for people to legitimize the indiscriminate killing of civilians unless there is a
strong hatred between communities of each side (Merari 1993). Due to the reasons I
mentioned above, terrorism has not only been the tool of very weak groups that are at
the rudimentary stages of becoming matured ones; but also, well-structured, largely
organized groups that are capable of sustaining an armed conflict with states on the
battlefield also commit to terrorism (Carter 2016) (Thomas 2014). Studies show that
countries already experiencing conflict are susceptible to a lot more terrorism-caused
deaths than the ones without civil conflict (Findley and Young 2012). Although this
is directly related to the weakness of such governments under conflict conditions,
which favors a habitat for early-stage armed groups to flourish, weak states are
vulnerable to guerrilla attacks as well. Moreover, it can even be argued that the
power asymmetry between a "powerful" state and a rebel group favors terrorism
choice much more than a situation where the state is weaker. To mitigate terrorism,
governments adopt security and intelligence measures. Not only these proactive
measures are very costly in monetary terms, but also, they don’t come as clean as
it was desired to do. Given that there is an audience that terrorist groups try to
provoke/galvanize, such proactive measures have the risk of mobilizing terror group
sympathizers. Governments’ accuracy in weakening the rebels are not always at its
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best; measures almost always come with collateral damage to the civilians. Beyond
the accuracy of these measures, violence can easily get out of hand due to its nature.
Given that these counter-insurgency activities are conducted by certain individuals,
negative externalities are just a matter of decision-making of that agent. These
measures may harm economic activity in general, which lowers the opportunity cost
of committing terror for sympathizers and they join the group. Another reason might
be mainly ideological; these policies might increase grievance and supporters might
join the group as fighters to get ideological satisfaction. Let me share some statistics
to show the importance of ethnic grievances on public opinion about terrorism,
although not from civil conflict. According to a PEW survey Perrin (2014), 46
percent of Palestinians think that suicide bombing, the cruelest form of terrorism,
can be often/sometimes justified. We also see a large gap between the tendencies of
respondents from Gaza and West Bank, 62 percent of the former think it’s legitimate
while 36 percent of the latter. It bolsters our argument given that Gaza has usually
been the target of Israeli operations, compared to West Bank. Respondents from
Lebanon comes at second, with 29 percent of them finding suicide attacks legitimate.
We see a large difference in shares between respondents of Shia and Sunni, 37 percent
of Shia can legitimize suicide attacks while only 21 of Sunni. It is interesting that
96 percent of Lebanese find Al-Qaeda’s actions unfavorable while 29 of them can
legitimize suicide bombing. Admittedly, intents/agendas behind these attacks are
politically and religiously not necessarily the same even though both argue that
they fight the enemies of Islam, however, this does not suffice to explain drastic
difference in views in my opinion. I argue that grievance caused by state actions
plays a huge role in the formation of these opinions. Although these grievances
emerge over a long span of time, every single action taken by state actors is another
contribution in this historical context, therefore, should not be overlooked. Also,
there is a phenomenon called "recency effect", which people are affected more by
recent developments rather than the former ones, even though they are of the same
weight/magnitude. The statistics show that opinion on suicide terrorism shows great
variance over time. (Perrin 2014). We see drops up to 16 percentage in people who
think that a suicide attack can be legitimized, in just one year in a country like
Palestine where ethnic grievances are thought to be very strong. Even though state
actions are not the sole reason for these fluctuations, the absence of a steady level
of support shows the ability of current actions to shape people’s view. This paper
analyzes the strategic interaction between a government and a rebel group where the
government chooses either to repress the group, to give independence or a hands-off
strategy, and the group responds it with either a terrorist attack, a war attempt
(which is aimed directly at the outcome goal, either via a series of guerrilla attacks,
or a conventional war, or a large protest), or nothing, which keeps the peaceful
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status-quo. In this paper’s context, 2 of these terrorist strategies, provocation, and
attrition are thought to help rebel groups. I want to understand the use of terrorist
attacks by a rebel group in a civil war with a game theoretical model which includes
2 players; center (government) and the periphery (rebel group). To do so, I did
an extension to Gibilisco (2016) paper. Before defining the original model and my
extension on it, I want to have a look at what the related literature says about the
topic, both mentioning empirical and formal studies.
1.1 Literature
1.1.1 Empirical Studies
Use of terrorism in the context of a civil war was analyzed by Fortna (2015)
where she compares the outcomes of civil wars whether there was terrorism used
or not. She concludes that terrorism helps these wars last longer however groups
committing terrorism are less likely to achieve their goals. Another work related to
the capability of rebel forces in civil wars is Hultman (2007), where she argues that
rebel groups tend to attack civilians more when they lose on the battlefields, which
is parallel to the mainstream view. Some other papers related to the effectiveness
of terrorism are Thomas (2014) where she concludes groups that use terrorist
violence do better at getting governments into negotiations and forcing them to
make concessions, analyzing the data from conflicts Africa. Pape (2003), although
not necessarily a civil war context, argues suicide bombings force governments
to make concessions in the 11 of 12 cases, except Turkey-PKK conflict. On the
contrary, Abrahms (2012) empirical study has shown that terrorism is not as effec-
tive as guerrilla warfare against state forces at inducing concessions by governments.
1.1.1.1 Studies with Formal Models
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Berman and Laitin (2017) ask the question on the theoretical basis that when do
groups commit suicide and find out that it is a viable option when the targets are
hard. He also empirically tests his hypotheses and concludes rich countries are more
susceptible to suicide attacks since they have better military protection. Carter
(2016)) constructs a perfect information game where rebel chooses either a terror
attack or a guerrilla attack with the hope of a provocative response. They look for
imprecise targeting from the government so that potential supporters would lean
more to the terror group. While choosing so, they should also consider the fact that
they could bear that forceful response. After testing his hypotheses empirically, he
concludes that groups choose guerrilla attacks to provoke forceful responses while
they choose terror attacks to avoid them. Rosendorff and Sandler (2010), con-
structed a formal model consisting of 3 players; Government, Rebel Leader, and the
potential supporters. In this game, Rebel leader chooses a portion of suicide attacks
to maximize his benefit and government chooses a preemptive action to weaken
the enemy, at the expense of damaging economic activities which would mobilize
rebel group supporters. Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) again constructs
a 3 players game where the players are the government, extremist faction, and ag-
grieved population. He tries to find out under which circumstances terrorism is an
effective tool to mobilize support for the rebel group. Again, Rosendorff and Sandler
(2004) formed a model, one that is similar to ours, where the government chooses a
proactive action to hinder potential terror attacks, which are to be committed after
observing government’s decision, either of a spectacular or a normal attack.
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2. GAME
Gibilisco is one of the very few who treats grievance as a seperate parameter in a
conflict game. In this section, I will explain Gibilisco’s game and his results, and
then motivation of my extension and how my game plays out.
2.1 Gibilisco’s Game
Gibilisco’s game consists of 2 actors; Center and Periphery. It is an infinitely-
staged repeated game. In each stage, center starts the game by either repressing
the periphery, giving independence or pursuing a hands-off strategy. In case of an
independence, there are no interaction between the actors anymore and they get
their corresponding payoffs for each stage. In case of a repression, periphery cannot
take an action, and game moves to the next stage. In cas of a hands-off strategy,
periphery can respond with either a war (can be a terrorist attack, guerrilla warfare,
protest etc.) or nothing, and game moves to the next stage. Here’s the representation
of the game:
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Figure 2.1 Gibilisco’s Game
Here are the payoffs:
piCC : Center’s utility when territory belongs to Center
piCP : Periphery’s utility when territory belongs to Center
piPP : Periphery’s utility when territory belongs to Periphery
−κC : Cost of Repression for Center
− : Center’s loss at a lost war
g : Level of grievance at the beginning
T : Loss of terror to both sides
2T : Loss of repression to Periphery
F (g) : Periphery’s probability of winning a war, increasing in g
gt+1 =max
{
gt−1,0
}
Future is discounted by δ.
2.2 Gibilisco’s Results
Gibilisco’s results are highly path-dependent. The game has 2 cut-off points for
initial grievance level. Levels below the area between these two points, mobilization
is tolerable for center, which eliminates future grievances. Levels above this area are
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way higher than what center can tolerate, hence, they either repress the periphery, or
grants independence instantly. As a result, periphery finds it desirable and feasible
to mobilize only for levels between these cutoff points. Another interesting result of
his game is about the timing, which suggests that decentralization cannot occur at
later stages of the game. To show how his mechanism reflect onto an example, he
gives Spain-Basque conflict illustration. Even though his game maps nicely upon this
example (and possibly some other historical examples), it fails to capture why some
other cases occuring such as Scotland and Wales’s decentralization after decades of
stalemate.
2.3 My Extension
In this section, I will explain why my extension is a valuable attempt and how I
motivate the parameters in my mechanism. My main contribution is, due to the
reasons I explained in detail in the previous section, treating terrorism as a different
form of war, , unlike Gibilisco’s game, in which all attacks/protests are represented as
a single strategy. Also, as opposed to the whole terrorism formal model literature,
treating grievance as a seperate parameter allows me to reflect use of terrorism
in a conflict better. In vast majority of terrorism work, terrorist group gets the
benefit immediately at that stage, although most of the time they aim for future
mobilization and get benefit for that. Having a grievance parameter makes it easier
differentiate between these two, therefore, have a more accurate representation of a
conflict between a state and a terrorist group.
My game consists of 2 stages, between a Center and a Periphery. Center starts
the game either repressing, granting independence or pursuing hands-off strategy.
Similar to what Gibilisco defines, in case of a repression, game moves to the second
stage, in case of an independence, the game ends and in case of a hands-off strategy,
periphery responds with either a terrorist attack, a war or nothing. Then we move
to the second round, where center starts with same strategies, and this time in case
of a hands-off strategy, periphery responds with only a war or nothing, since this is
the last stage of the game and there’s no future that the periphery can realize the
utility of a terrorist attack.
Strategies for Center in both stages are {I,R,H} where I stands for Independence,
R stands of Repression and H stands for Hands-Off
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Strategies for Periphery in the first stage are {NW,T,W} and in the second stage
are {NW,W} where NW stands for No-War, T stands for a terrorist attack and W
stands for War. Payoffs for each stage are similar with Gibilisco’s game except:
Grievance level increases by 1 after a repression, and 1/2 after a terrorist attack. I
assume that the terrorist attack is responded by a backlash from center, therefore, it
increases the grievance next period, however, not as much as what repression does.
I just assigned it as 1/2 to keep things simple.
When periphery conducts a terrorist attack, both sides incur a cost of T. In case of
a repression, periphery incurs a repression cost of 2T. The second premise follows
from the assumption that repression’s cost to periphery is more than backlash’s cost.
Again, I kept things simple and assigned them as T and 2T. The first premise, where
both parties incur a cost after a terrorist attack, follows from the fact that center
gets damaged after a terrorist attack, in terms of both materiality and reputation,
while periphery suffers from a backlash of the center. It is important to note that
repression and this backlash are different, repression is an act where periphery, or
minority people/geography is isolated in a way that they cannot take any action.
However, backlash’s can be thought of local counter-operations, mostly just after the
terrorist attacks, or center’s people’s social backlash against periphery people. This
one is nicely addressed by Gould and Klor (2016); they show that 9/11 attacks made
it harder to assimilate for Muslims in USA due to the reactions they get afterwards.
Also, Benmelech and Klor (2016) show that lack of assimilation is one of the main
drivers of flow of foreign fighters to ISIS. These are two empirical works which affirm
the motivations behind my mechanism.
To keep things simple, I do not have a discount factor for the second stage.
Lastly, I assumed that cost of repression is never equal to a payoff Center gets by
holding the territory. This is a borderline case and has no value in our story, so I
made this assumption in order to present one of my equilibra more smoothly.
2.3.1 Results
• IWIW is an equilibrium if
– picc <Kc
– F (g) ·pipp− (1−F (g)) · (Kc−picp)> picp
– 0> (1−F (g)) ·picc−ψ ·F (g)
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• RWRW is an equilibrium if
– picc >Kc
– F (g) ·pipp− (1−F (g)) · (Kc−picp)> picp
– picc−Kc > (1−F (g)) ·picc−ψ ·F (g)
– and number of innocents killed and wounded.
• HNHN is an equilibrium if
– picp > F (g)pipp+(1−F (g))
(
picp−Kp
)
– 2picp > picp+F (g−1)
(
pipρ−Kp
)
+ (1−F (g−1))
(
picp−Kp
)
• HTIW is an equilibrium if
– picp−T+f(g+1/2)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
> 2picp - T
– picc−T +f(g+1/2) · (−ψ)+(1−f(g+1/2))(picc)< picc−T
– picp+f(g−1)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp
)
> 2picp
– picc+f(g−1) · (−ψ)+(1−f(g−1))(picc)> picc
– picp+f(g+1/2)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
−T >
picp+f(g−1)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp
)
– This suggests that, rebel groups rely heavily on targeting civilians with-
out committing other forms of war are still likely to get independence,
concessions etc.
– Hypothesis 1: Groups conduct mostly terrorist attacks can force their
opponents into concessions.
• HTHW is an equilibrium if
– picp−T +F
(
g+ 12
)(
pipp−kp
)
+
(
1−F
(
g+ 12
))
(picp−Kp)> 2picp−T
– picp−T +F
(
g+ 12
)(
pipp−kp
)
+
(
1−F
(
g+ 12
))
(picp−Kp) >2F(g)pipp− (1−
F (g))(Kp−picp)
– picp−T +F
(
g+ 12
)(
pipp−kp
)
+
(
1−F
(
g+ 12
))
(picp−Kp)>2picp
– picc−T +f
(
g+ 12
)
· (−ψ) + +
(
1−F
(
g+ 12
))
picc > 2picc−kc−T
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– picc−T +f
(
g+ 12
)
· (−ψ) + +
(
1−F
(
g+ 12
))
picc > 0
– picc−T +f
(
g+ 12
)
· (−ψ) + +
(
1−F
(
g+ 12
))
> 2picc > 2(picc−kc)
– picc−T +f
(
g+ 12
)
· (−ψ) + +
(
1−F
(
g+ 12
))
> picc−T
– picc−T +f
(
g+ 12
)
· (−ψ) + +
(
1−F
(
g+ 12
))
> 2(picc−kc)
– Hypothesis 2: The only equilibria including terrorist attacks is which the
periphery follows up with a war, or Center granting independence. so
terrorist attacks shorten the duration of conflicts.
Before going into the empirical tests, I want to discuss what this extension brings
to the literature. Firstly, in this model, seperation can occur in both stages, which
shows how both early and later seperations occur. Secondly, we see that terrorist
attacks are conduct only when they’re followed by a war attempt, which ends the
conflict in favour of either side. This suggests that use of terrorism shortens the
duration of conflicts, and I will test it empirically. Lastly, we see that there is an
equilibrium in which periphery conducts a terrorist attack and gets independence
afterwards, without a war attempt. This suggests that groups relying heavily/solely
on terrorism can still pose a credible threat to their opponents in order to get
independence. These two results are in line with a good number of extant literature
in terrorism, both theoretically and empirically.
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3. EMPIRICAL TESTS
3.1 Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1: The only equilibrium including terrorist attacks is which the periphery
follows up with a war, so terrorist attacks shorten the duration of conflicts.
To test this hypothesis, I make use of Acosta (2016) and Benjamin (2016) replica-
tion data . Since suicide attacks are a strong form of terrorism, it is reasonable to
disaggregate terrorist attacks in this way. Suicide Attack Network Database con-
sists of variables such as target type which can be combatant, political and civilian,
location of target and organizaton which can be foreign, domestic or mixed, and
specific conflict and conflict types. Duration is the dependent variable in this anal-
ysis. Main explanatory variable is a dummy variable which indicates whether that
particular group has ever conducted a suicide attack or not, in its entire lifetime,
and its network ties. Addition to them, some other variables are used as control
such as organization size (whether it is more than one thousand or ten thousand),
dummy variables for organization ideology (islamist or leftist), whether the purpose
of the organization is self-determination or not, number of states which sponsors the
organization, the number of Safe havens utilized by the group, the number of total
Attacks conducted by the group, the total number of Kills incurred by the organi-
zation, GDP per capita and Polity score as development proxy variables of enemy,
whether the group has held Hegemonic status over its rivals, and lastly, a Unified
Front is marked by the group, which means all alliances of that group striving for a
specific outcome goal or not.
To test his hypothesis, he makes use of the Cox proportional-hazards model (Cox
1972). This model is mostly used by medical statisticians to analyze the relation
between survival time of patients and explanatory variables, which can be genotype,
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sex, drugs that are used by patients. It became a common tool in modern conflict
literature, in which conflicts can be analogous to patients in the sense that they
both have a lifetime and some of them die/end.
In his paper, Acosta’s main finding suggests the opposite: He claims that suicide
attacks increase rebel groups’ longevity, and hence, duration of civil conflicts. How-
ever, his results may be flawed. The reason is; he assigns a dummy variable for
each group which indicates whether this group has conducted a suicide attack or
not, during its whole lifetime. I claim this is not an accurate way of reflecting the
effect of suicide attacks. As I mentioned in the introduction, terrorist attacks are
conducted to attract people and people’s tendencies vary a lot even year by year,
which implies that impact of terrorist attacks tend to vanish over time. As a result,
using the same dataset, I created dummy variables for whether that group did a
suicide attack or not in last 1,2,3,4 and 5 years. I also adjusted some other variables
in the same way (for example, to control for strength of the group, I used number
of killings in 1,2,3,4 and 5 years for each dummy variable). Here’s the table showing
my results:
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Table 3.1 Regression Summaries
Dependent variable:
age.x
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observations 143 102 86 68 61
R2 0.321 0.263 0.209 0.236 0.275
Max. Possible R2 0.986 0.958 0.930 0.913 0.883
Log Likelihood −276.236 −146.256 −104.447 −74.010 −55.766
Wald Test (df = 15) 46.760∗∗∗ 42.880∗∗∗ 22.940∗ 35.030∗∗∗ 14.030
LR Test (df = 15) 55.409∗∗∗ 31.182∗∗∗ 20.185 18.336 19.594
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 15) 43.120∗∗∗ 25.828∗∗ 17.170 17.894 17.122
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variable:
age.x
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
onethousand1 −0.926∗∗ −0.660 −0.620 −0.383 −1.628∗
(0.483) (0.537) (0.552) (0.661) (0.900)
tenthousand1 0.323 0.045 0.256 −0.457 −0.248
(0.680) (0.742) (0.747) (0.885) (0.876)
islamist1 −0.448 −0.569 −0.450 −0.284 −0.244
(0.390) (0.567) (0.659) (0.823) (0.956)
leftist1 −0.338 −0.272 0.038 0.107 0.479
(0.381) (0.511) (0.595) (0.685) (0.756)
nsd1 −0.472 −0.261 −0.156 0.084 0.873
(0.304) (0.387) (0.460) (0.591) (0.760)
as1 −0.041
(0.028)
ks1 0.002
(0.008)
as2 −0.025∗
(0.017)
ks2 0.003∗
(0.003)
as3 −0.010
(0.009)
ks3 0.002
(0.001)
as4 −0.003
(0.003)
ks4 0.001∗
(0.001)
as5 −0.002
(0.003)
ks5 0.0004
(0.001)
safe 0.212 0.185 0.638 −0.203 0.229
(0.430) (0.528) (0.585) (0.915) (0.872)
sponsors −0.109 0.008 −0.026 0.264 0.245
(0.128) (0.152) (0.162) (0.211) (0.225)
ties.x −0.140∗ −0.135 −0.217∗∗ −0.281∗∗ −0.282∗∗
(0.069) (0.082) (0.097) (0.118) (0.136)
polity.x 0.019 0.032 0.036 0.012 −0.016
(0.020) (0.030) (0.038) (0.049) (0.057)
gdp −0.007 −0.004 −0.008 −0.018 −0.049∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.030)
uf1 −0.314 −0.077 0.026 −0.739 −0.380
(0.516) (0.595) (0.616) (0.771) (0.814)
hegemonic1 −0.376 −0.538 −0.234 0.040 1.550
(0.356) (0.448) (0.521) (0.706) (1.031)
dummy1 1.236∗∗ 1.166∗∗ 1.462∗ 0.849 0.993
(0.586) (0.655) (0.824) (0.798) (1.004)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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As can be seen in summary statistics, Wald Test gives significant values in each of
the regressions except the one with 5 years. When we look at the regression table,
for the regressions with 1, 2 and 3 years dummy variables, suicide attack dummy
variables reduces the duration of conflict and the coefficients are significant. For 4
and 5 years, it still reduces the duration however the coefficients are not statistically
significant. This may be due to the vanishing tendency of suicide attacks over time,
or small number observations for 4 and 5 years. It is also important to note that
Wald Statistics was not significant for 5 years regression, which makes it harder to
rely on that model.
Although these results support my hypothesis, even though suicide attacks can be
a good measure of terrorism, these impacts may be restricted to suicide attacks,
hence, may not be generalisable for all terrorist attacks.
3.2 Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2: Groups conduct mostly terrorist attacks can achieve their outcome
goals.
Although I did not test this hyptohesis myself, there’s a vast extant literature in line
with this view. In a highly-cited paper, using evidence from 11 conflicts, Pape (2003)
has shown that suicide attacks are useful to push states to make concessions. All
of these 11 examples except one (between Turkey-PKK) ended up in favour of the
rebel group, after the use of suicide attacks. In a recent paper, using a monthly data
including African Civil Wars between 1989-2010, Thomas (2014) has empirically
shown that use of terrorism resulted in more concessions and negotiations between
states and rebel groups.
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4. CONFLICT DURATION FORECASTING
4.1 Literature
Forecasting has been becoming more popular in social sciences, especially in conflict
literature. More and more statistical methods are employed by conflict scholars.
Some of the recent conflict forecasting work worth mentioning are the following:
Using a 1970-2009 cross-sectional dataset, Hegre et al. (2013) predict conflicts be-
tween 2010-2050 using core exogenous predictors as population size, infant mortality
rates, demographic composition, education levels, oil dependence, ethnic cleavages,
and neighborhood characteristics. Weidmann and Ward (2010) incorporate geo-
located data on conflict events in Bosnia between 1992-1995 to predict future con-
flict, using simulation approach. While Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013)
built a forecast model of civil war that relies on relatively static measures of hor-
izontal inequality, using this model, Chiba and Gleditsch (2017) explore whether
dynamic information about mobilization and the behavior of actors from event data
can increase forecast accuracy.
4.2 Strategy
My research question is, can we forecast the lifetime of ongoing conflicts? To an-
swer this question, I replicated the work of Benjamin (2016), which tries to see the
impacts suicide attacks have, and concludes that they increase longevity of rebel
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groups. In this article, he makes use of the Acosta (2016), which was created by
himself. Covering suicide attacks between 1980-2017 SAND lists date of attack,
sponsoring organization/s, location and target of attack, and number of innocents
killed and wounded. In addition, the database categorizes suicide attacks by tar-
get type (combatant, political, and/or civilian), target location (foreign, domestic,
or mixed), organization location (foreign, domestic, or mixed), specific conflict and
conflict type. By replicating this paper, I was able to use 300+ conflicts, almost
half of them had already finished, while the remaining are still ongoing. All vari-
ables he included, and so I included, are: whether an organization Conducts suicide
attacks, organization age (dependent variable), the organization size variables of
1,000-plus members and 10,000-plus members, the organization ideology variables
of political islam and leftist, the nationalist goal variable of self-determination, an
organization’s number of state sponsors, the number of safe havens an organization
has utilized, the number of attacks an organization has carried out, the number of
kills an organization has inflicted, the primary enemy development variables of GDP
per capita and polity, whether an organization has held hegemonic status over its
rivals, and whether an organization is of a unified front, that is, an alliance of all
groups seeking a particular outcome goal. To determine the duration of ongoing con-
flicts, I employed the following strategy: training prediction models on conflicts that
already ended, I predicted the lifetime of ongoing conflicts by using these trained
models. I used KNN, Lasso, Ridge and Random Forest algorithms. I did not use
Logit because my outcome variable is of continuous nature. The reason I did not
employ a count model is, they’re used for data for certain time periods, however,
my outcome variable itself is time.
4.3 Methods
First, I checked for correlation between variables. Only as and ks variables had
correlation over 0.75, and since they’re categorical variables, I eliminated them only
for KNN prediction. As the next step, I divided my sample into two; dead and
ongoing conflicts. Next, using regsubsets function and doing cross-validation, I
found the best number of predictors to work with for Ridge and Lasso.
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Figure 4.1 Mean of CV errors
As shown in the graph, 15 variables give us the minimum mean error, after cross-
validation is done.
After finding the number of variables, I need to find optimum lambda level for ridge
and lasso separately. Lambda is the level of penalty for each coefficient; we want to
get rid of the effects of unimportant variables and we do it by penalizing them by
lambda.
This is the minimization formula. For Ridge, we set alpha as 0 and for Lasso, we
set alpha as 1.
Here is the coefficient penalties for Ridge:
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Figure 4.2 Ridge Log Lambda Coefficients
Here is the graph showing the lambda level which gives the minimum error in pre-
diction, which is 5.491599:
Figure 4.3 MSEs for Ridge Log Lambdas
18
Here is the coefficient penalties for Lasso:
Figure 4.4 Lasso Log Lambda Coefficients
Here is the graph showing the lambda level which gives the minimum error in pre-
diction, which is 0.4776313:
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Figure 4.5 MSEs for Lasso Log Lambdas
After I predicted ongoing conflicts using both models with parameters above, pre-
diction MSE’s for Ridge and Lasso are 76.28729 and 76.05304 respectively. Since
they’re very close to each other, I decided to make use of both models.
To do a Random Forest prediction, first I needed to how many and which variables
to include in my model. To do so, I did RFE (Recursive Feature Elimination). The
graph shows that I should include 18 variables in my model:
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Figure 4.6 MSEs for Variables
These 18 variables are "as" "hegemonic" "ties" "islamist" "sponsors" "polity" "ks" "gdp"
"leftist" "sa" "civilwar" "safe" "iraq" "onethousand" "jointas" "nsd" "tenthousand" and
"afghan". "as", "hegemonic", "ties", "islamist", "sponsors" are the best 5 predictor.
Here is the graph showing node purity values for each variable:
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Figure 4.7 Node purity values
Lastly, I did KNN prediction. Before doing so, stored all variables as numeric, nor-
malized them excluded "ks" variable and did cross-validation to find optimum k,
which minimizes the error for 18-variable prediction. Note that I used the vari-
ables suggested by RFE. Optimum k turns out to be 8, and I complete all of my
predictions.
There are 147 conflicts that I predicted and it is not convenient to list durations of
all of them. Instead, I can share summary statistics for each prediction:
Table 4.1 Summary of Predictions
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
knnyear 147 1,994.320 19.993 1,880.009 1,983.278 2,008.250 2,030.000
ridgeyear 147 1,997.985 21.352 1,877.646 1,985.815 2,011.298 2,051.842
lassoyear 147 1,999.004 21.629 1,880.619 1,987.284 2,011.885 2,063.812
rfmbyear 147 1,998.810 19.719 1,883.685 1,988.420 2,012.505 2,028.302
Although each prediction was carried out meticulously, results seem to have failed
since majority of the predicted years have already past. One reason might be very
small number of observation. To deal with that, future research might incorporate
more small-size specific techniques, or make use of AI. Another reason could be the
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outliers; for example, Ku Klux Klan was established in 1866 and is still alive. Ar-
guably, its characteristics as an organization, both in terms of use of violence and
type of clash especially in modern era, diverges dramatically from other conflicts.
Inclusion of organizations as KKK and alike could mess up the prediction, especially
when they have been alive for over a century. Not random elimination but a system-
atic classification of these conflicts could preculde potential prediction biases. Other
reason might be simply the lack of variables, inclusion of possible key variables for
duration might alleviate the issue.
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5. CONCLUSION
Lack of focus on the ethnic/religious grievance in terrorism literature caused me
to ask the following research question: How does the existence of ethnic/religious
grievance impact rebel strategies, mainly terrorism? To answer this question I de-
cided to make usef of applied game theory. I extended Michael Gibilisco’ (2016)
manuscript which employs grievance as a separate parameter in a repeated game,
without differentiating between forms of war. By simplifying into a 2-stage game, I
extended this model by employing terrorism as a different strategy for rebel group,
or as used in this paper, Periphery. Doing this extension allowed me to have a two-
sided trade-off, whereas the original paper had one by Center’s side. Also, inclusion
of grievance parameter served a better purpose to reflect terrorism’s use in a formal
model, especially regarding time related consequences. As a result, my extension
was able to produce equilibria in which not only moderately aggrieved groups were
able to separate from centers, as it was suggested in the original paper, but also
less and much aggrieved peripheries were capable as well, former being able to make
use of terrorism to aggrieve their people. My extension has also produced equilibria
in which periphery could separate not only during earlier stages, but also later in
the conflict. Addition to them, my model produced 2 testable hypotheses: Use of
terrorism shortens the duration of conflicts and can make opponents offer conces-
sions/negotiations. While the second one is already parallel to a number of studies,
including empirical ones and case studies, I myself tested the first hypothesis. Us-
ing Suicide Attack Network Database (SAND) and replicating Acosta’s paper, I
have shown that suicide attacks indeed shorten the duration of conflicts. Lastly,
as a unique attempt in conflict forecasting literature, using the same dataset and
making use of machine learning algorithms, I predicted the durations of ongoing
conflicts, with the models I trained in conflicts that have already ended.
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APPENDIX A
Proofs of Equilibria
Before starting to prove each equilibrium, I want to prove impossibility of some
strategies in the subgame after Center chooses HO in stage 1. This will help me
sketch my proofs more easily. The subgame is drawn below:
In this game tree, 1 stands for Center and 2 stands for Periphery. Under the as-
sumption that both agents play rationally, I will show the outcomes that do not
survive. To ensure sequential rationality, I will apply backward induction in all of
my proofs.
HNRW is never an equilibrium
Proof: Starting by Periphery’s action in Stage 2. HNRW brings Periphery a payoff
of 2picp− 2T . Choosing W in Stage 2 means that W brings a better payoff than H
for Periphery, which is:
picp+f(g−1)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp )> 2picp
Implied by this inequality, choosing W in the first stage should bring Perihery a
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payoff of:
2
(
f(g)pipp− (1−f(g))(kp−picp)) > 2picp−2T
While left hand side increases by the increase in f() function, right hand side de-
creases by 2T. Hence, Periphery would deviate to W in the first stage.
HNRN is never an equilibrium
Proof: This outcome brings Center a payoff of 2picc−kc. If Center deviates to HO
in the second stage, HNHN brings Center 2picc > 2picc−kc.
HNIN is never an equilibrium
Proof: This outcome brings Center a payoff of 2picc. If Center deviates to HO in the
second stage, HNHN brings Center 2picc > 2picc.
HNHW is never an equilibrium
Proof: Very similar to first proof. This outcome means Periphery prefers W to N in
stage 2. Which is:
picp+f(g−1)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp )> 2picp
This purifies to:
f(g−1)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp )> picp
So the total payoff is certainly smaller than:
2(f(g−1)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp ))
Let’s call the total payoff as:
2(f(g−1)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp ))− 
A deviation to W in the first stage brings Periphery a payoff of:
2
(
f(g)(pipp−kp)− (1−f(g))(kp−picp))
Comparing these two:
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2
(
f(g)(pipp−kp)− (1−f(g))(kp−picp)) >
2(f(g−1)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp ))− 
Without needing the , the former is larger than the latter since f() function is an
increasing function and f(g)>f(g-1).
HTRW is never an equilibrium
Proof: This brings Periphery a payoff of:
2picp−3T
If Periphery deviates to N in the first stage, as I eliminated the others above, there
are 2 possible equilibriums: HNIW, which brings picp+pipp and HNHN, which brings
2picp.
Both are larger than 2picp− 3T , hence, Periphery would deviate to N in the first
stage.
HTRN is never an equilibrium
Proof: This brings Center a utility of:
2picc−kc−T .
If center deviates to HO in the second stage as well, the resulting strategy HTHN
would bring Center:
2picc−T > 2picc−kc−T
HTIN is never an equilibrium
Proof: This brings Center a payoff of:
picc−T
If Center deviates to Hands Off in second stage, it gains:
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2picc−T > picc−T
The outcomes that are never equilibrium after Center chooses R in the
first stage
RNHN is never an equilibrium
Proof: Periphery choosing N in the second stage means that it prefers N over W,
which is mathematically:
2picp−2T > picp−2T +(1−f(g+1))(pipp−kp)+f(g+1)
(
pipp−kp
)
which purifies to:
picp > (1−f(g+1))(pipp−kp)+f(g+1)
(
pipp−kp
)
This implies that in case of Center chooses H in the first stage, the Periphery would
choose N, which results in HNHN. This gives Center a payoff of:
2picc > 2(picc−kc)
Which is larger than what Center gets under RNHN. Hence, Center would deviate
to H in the first stage.
RWIW is never an equilibrium
Proof: The payoff Center gets is:
picc−kc
If picc−kc > 0, Center would deviate from I to R in the second stage since
2picc−kc > picc−kc If picc−kc < 0, Center would deviate from R to I in the first stage
since
0 > picc−kc
The only condition that makes RWIW an equilibrium is picc = kc. Since this does not
contribute a novelty to our story, I simply make the assumption that this equality
30
never holds, to simplify solutions.
RNIN is never an equilibrium
Proof: Very similar to RNHN. Periphery choosing N in the second stage means that
it prefers N over W, which is mathematically:
2picp−2T > picp−2T +(1−f(g+1))(pipp−kp)+f(g+1)
(
pipp−kp
)
which purifies to:
picp > (1−f(g+1))(pipp−kp)+f(g+1)
(
pipp−kp
)
This implies that in case of Center chooses H in the first stage, the Periphery would
choose N, which results in HNHN. This gives Center a payoff of:
2picc > picc
Which is larger than what Center gets under RNHN. Hence, Center would deviate
to H in the first stage.
Proofs of each equilibrium
Proof of RWRW
Proof: Doing backward induction, I start by the last node. In order Center to
choose Repression in both stages, Periphery should choose W in second stage rather
than N, otherwise Center would deviate to H in the second stage. The condition for
Periphery to choose W over N is:
2picp−2T < picp−2T +(1−f(g+1))(pipp−kp)+f(g+1)
(
pipp−kp
)
In the upper node, Center should find it more enjoyable to Repress rather than
Hands-Off. Condition is:
2picc−2kc > picc−kc+(1−f(g+1))picc−f(g+1)
In the upper node, in case of Center chooses Hands Off, picc > kc implies that Center
would not choose I in second stage, hence, the only outcome that is left is HNHN,
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which Center would certainly deviate to. The condition to eliminate this outcome
is when Periphery chooses War in the first stage, which is satisfied by :
2
(
f(g)(pipp−kp)− (1−f(g))(kp−picp)) > 2picp
and Center should prefer to repress both stages over RWHW, which depends on the
condition:
2(picc−kc)> 2((1−f(g)picc−f(g)ψ)
Also Center should not deviate to I, which is satisfied by:
2(picc−kc)> 0
Under HT, picc > kc implies Center never prefers HTIW over RWRW. The only equi-
librium under HT remains as HTHW. In order Center not to deviate to Hands Off
in the first stage, the condition is:
picc−T +F (g+1/2) · (−ψ)+(1−f(g+1/2))picc < 2(picc−kc)
Proof of IWIW
Proof: Since choosing I immediately ends the game in the first stage, I will check
deviations to possible equilibriums under when Repression or Hands-Off are chosen
in the first stage. In case Center chooses Hands Off in the first stage, in case
Periphery chooses either N or T, Center can continue with choosing I in the second
stage, which gives him payoffs respectively:
picc,picc − T > 0 with the help of the assumption that a terror attack could never
damage more than the enjoyment Center gets when it controls territory. Since both
of them brings a higher utility than 0, Periphery should not choose T or N under
HO, which means it should prefer W in the first stage. This is satisfied by:
2(f(g)pipp− (1−f(g))
(
kp−picp
)
)> picp+pipp
The condition that makes I more preferable than Hands Off for Center is:
0> 2((1−f(g))(picc)−f(g)
I should be more profitable for C than R in the first stage. 2 possible equilibriums
under R are RWRW and RWHW. The conditions are:
0> picc−kc for RWRW,
0> picc−kc+(1−f(g+1))picc−f(g+1)ψ for RWHW.
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Proof of HTHW
Proof: In stage 2, Periphery chooses W over N:
picp−T+f(g+1/2)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
> 2picp−T
Under T, Center should not deviate to I, which is another possible equilibrium. To
ensure this:
picc−T +f(g+1/2) ·(−ψ)+(1−f(g+1/2))(picc)>picc−T should hold. This condition
also implies that, in case of Periphery chooses N under H, Center does not choose I
after N. So the only possible equilibrium left under HN is HNHN. Hence, choosing
T should be preferable to N and W in first stage, for Periphery. Conditions for that
are as follows:
picp−T+f(g+1/2)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g+1/2))(picp−kp) >
2((F (g)pipp− (1−f(g)).(kp−picρ)
picp−T+f(g+1/2)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
>2picp
First equilibrium implies that Under RH, Periphery would prefer W over N. Hence,
I should characterize the conditions under which Center chooses H over R and I in
the first stage:
picc−T +f(g+1/2) · (−ψ)+(1−f(g+1/2))(picc) >
picc−kc+f(g+1) · (−ψ)+(1−f(g+1))(picc) (over RWHW)
picc−T +f(g+1/2) · (−ψ)+(1−f(g+1/2))(picc)> 2(picc−kc) (over RWRW)
picc−T +f(g+1/2) · (−ψ)+(1−f(g+1/2))(picc)> 0 (over IWIW)
Proof of HTIW
Proof: Starting from the last node. Since HTHN obviously and undeniably brings
a higher utility to Center, in order for him not to deviate to H in second stage,
HTHW should be more preferable than HTHN for Periphery. This is satisfied by:
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picp−T+f(g+1/2)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
> 2picp - T
HTHW should be less desirable for Center than HTIW, which is satisfied by:
picc−T +f(g+1/2) · (−ψ)+(1−f(g+1/2))(picc)< picc−T
Now I should show Periphery does not deviate to N or W in the first stage. Under
N, 2 possible equilibriums are HNIW and HNHN which bring Center higher utility
than HTIW. It is important to note that HNIW also brings Periphery higher
utility. Possibility of HTIW being an equilibrium strictly depends on the following
conditions:
Under HNH, Periphery chooses HNHW over HNHN
Under HN, Center prefers HNHW over HNI
Periphery finds HTIW more desirable than HNHW.
The following equations represent these preferences:
picp+f(g−1)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp
)
> 2picp
picc+f(g−1) · (−ψ)+(1−f(g−1))(picc)> picc
picp+f(g+1/2)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
−T >
picp+f(g−1)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp
)
Now we can get back to first stage. For Periphery, HTIW should be more desirable
than other possible equilibrium, which is HWHW. To ensure this:
picp+f(g+1/2)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
−T >
2(f(g+1/2)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
) should hold.
For Center not to deviate to I or R in the first stage, HTIW should bring more
utility than IWIW, RWRW and RWHW, which are the other possible equilibria.
The conditions are:
picp−T+f(g+1/2)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
> 0
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picp−T+f(g+1/2)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
> 2(picc−kc)
picp−T+f(g+1/2)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
>
picp+f(g+1)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g+1))
(
picp−kp
)
Proof of HNHN
Proof: Note that this is the outcome that Center finds most profitable in entire
game. Hence, I just need to ensure that HNHN is more desirable for Periphery in
every sequence as well. Starting by the last node, under HNH, N should be more
preferable to Periphery than W:
picp+f(g−1)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g−1))
(
picp−kp
)
< 2picp
Among N, T and W, in the first stage, Periphery should find HNHN more enjoy-
able than the other possible equilibria under HT (HTIW and HTHW) and HW.
Conditions satisfying them, respectively:
2picp>picp+f(g+1/2)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
−T
2picp> picp−T+f(g+1/2)
(
pipp−kp
)
+(1−f(g+1/2))
(
picp−kp
)
2picp>2(f(g)pipp− (1−f(g))
(
kp−picp
)
)
Proof of HW
Proof: Starting from the last node, I need to show choosing W in the first stage is
more desirable for Periphery than choosing T and N. Hence, it should bring more
utility than the possible equilibria under HT (HTIN and HTHW) and HN (HNHN
and HNIW). Note that HTHW brings more utility than HNHW and HNIW brings
more utility than HTIW, hence, only 2 inequalities are enough to prove our premise:
2(f(g)pipp− (1−f(g))(kp−picp)) >
picp−T+f(g+1/2)(pipp−kp)+(1−f(g+1/2))(picp−kp)
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2(f(g)pipp− (1−f(g))
(
kp−picp
)
) > pipp+picp
Now, I should show that choosing H (and ending up at HW) brings more utility
than R (RWRW and RWHW) and IWIW. The following equations characterize my
final equilibrium, respectively:
2(picc−kc)< 2((1−f(g))(picc)−f(g)
picc+(1−f(g+1))(picc)−f(g+1)ψ < 2((1−f(g))(picc)−f(g)
0< 2((1−f(g))(picc)−f(g)
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